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by Stephanie M. Wildman
The racial transformation of society envisioned in
Martin Luther King's dream has been an emotional and
powerful ideal. That vision has gone through its own
transformation: it was first described as "integration,"
then "affirmative action," and then "diversity" and
"multiculturalism." As each of these phrases acquired
negative connotation from reactionary, conservative
backlashes, a new phrase has had to be invented to carry
forward that transformative vision. Yet the cycle of
exclusion that gives privileges to the dominant cultural
status quo continues.
One place, close to home, where the dream of
integration has not been fulfilled is in the cloistered halls of
legal academia. This chapter singles out legal education to
illustrate the dream of integration and the cycle of
exclusion examining the small group dynamics that serve to
maintain the dominant status quo. A description of the
issues, as they arise in legal academia, provides an example
that many lawyers, judges, and professors know well and
portrays the complexity of the exclusionary dynamic.
The legal academy serves as the gateway to the legal
profession. The academy and the profession remain
primarily white and male; the gatekeepers to this still
segregated domain are the legal academicians. The harm
of segregation has been clearly recognized by modern
judges. Judge John Minor Wisdom, the author of many
leading desegregation decisions in the 1960s, described
that harm as "[d]enial of access to the dominant culture,
lack of opportunity in any meaningful way to participate
in political and other public activities, [and] the stigma of
apartheid condemned in the Thirteenth Amendment." 1
Another serious harm of segregation is that the dominant
culture has no access to the insights of the segregated
culture and does not even perceive this omission as a loss.
The problems of denial of access, lack of opportunity,
stigma, and lost insights have continued to surface as the
struggle to achieve integration has continued on new
battlefront with a different vocabulary.
Judge Wisdom recognized the importance of faculty
integration in the desegregation of Southern schools. No
less compelling is the necessity for faculty integration at the
law school level if the legal profession is to be integrated.
Nondiscrimination is the law and a goal upon which all
agree in theory. This chapter examines some of the
obstacles to the attainment of that goal of
nondiscrimination, using the example of law school faculty
hiring. Antidiscrimination law requires "victims" who file
charges against "perpetrators." 2 Yet the collegial etiquette
of the academy (and of many other societal institutions)
requires that accusations of discrimination not be made.
Even if they are made, the deliberations leading to
appointments and tenure decisions are cloaked in secrecy to
protect academic freedom and collegial communications.
The discrimination plaintiff, however, must pierce the
protective veil or lose her case: she must articulate who
said what, when and for what purpose. Even with access
to otherwise confidential files, the discrimination plaintiff
may not be able to document the group dynamics that
resulted in the tenuring or hiring decision. Group
dynamics, which are rarely captured in written form, are
hard to convey in the concrete details required for
litigation. Yet these group interrelations operate as a
subtext to any faculty hiring or tenure decision and can be
characterized as a micro legal system.
Integrating the academy by lawsuits may be not only
difficult, but also not as effective as less litigious
approaches through voluntary action. Association of
American Law Schools (AALS) president Herma Hill Kay
reminded law school professors that three past AALS
presidents have "stressed the importance and value to legal
education of the commitment to achieving diversity among
the faculty." 3 Kay's article described legal academia's
faltering progress in recruiting and retaining professors
who are people of color, women, gay, or lesbian.
Noting that members of these groups have suffered from
a long history of exclusion and are entering a profession
that has been "traditionally dominated by white men," Kay
concluded that "those who have been the insiders must be
sensitive to their unspoken assumptions about the
newcomers. A commitment to diversity cannot succeed
without the willingness to hear, understand, and accept their
different voices."
4 Acknowledging that acceptance will not
be easy, Kay reminded faculty that diversity will bring
"intellectual richness" to legal education.
Kay's point that faculty diversity enhances the
educational institution is important. Many view the goal
of affirmative action, or diversity (as it is now often called
in order to avoid the stigma associated with the term
"affirmative action"), as one of aesthetic balance—we all
need a person of color, a woman, or a gay or lesbian
colleague, lest we look bad. But much more is at stake
here than appearances or even our view of ourselves as
nonracist, nonsexist, and nonhomophobic.
The reality of American democracy and the institutions
within it is that social privileges are accorded based on
race, sex, class, and sexual preference. Given the history
of exclusion of women, people of color, gays, and
lesbians to which Kay refers, some kind of institutional
acting that is affirmative is required to overcome the
effects of that exclusion. Proponents of equality must
reclaim and relegitimate the notion of acting affirmatively
to ensure our integration with all members of society and
to end the perpetuation of the predominantly white, male,
and heterosexual status quo.
This chapter seeks to tell stories about recruiting and
retaining faculty members from nonmajority groups as
they might really occur. While the incidents described are
fictitious, any resemblance to real interaction on law
school faculties is quite intentional.
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Unwritten Rules
Walter O. Wcyrauch has described law as a network of
small group interactions in which basic characteristics of
legal systems govern the interactions of individuals within
small groups. 5 Paralleling law as a linking in large social
group interaction, each small group has its own operating
principles and generates, through its own group dynamics,
proper rules of behavior for members in the group.
Weyrauch studied the interaction of nine men who
participated in a three-month nutrition experiment isolated in
a Berkeley penthouse. He observed normative behavior that
he described as the basic law or constitutional document of
the group. This behavioral constitution expressed "some
form of understanding based on shared ideals." 6
The foremost canon of a group's dynamic is that the
"rules are not to be articulated." This rule, that the group
not identify and articulate its own rules, occurs on law
faculties as well as in experimental groups. Although
Weyrauch's work has been criticized for focusing on the
group's own rule system—rather than on ascertaining
internal effects of external rules—his study showed that
the external social realities of racism and sexism affected
the rules of the group. Weyrauch found ethnic prejudices
within the context of group dynamics, even among a
group professing to be "highly liberal about civil rights."
Describing some of the laws of this penthouse group,
Weyrauch observed, "Equality of all persons is espoused,
but women are not really treated as equal (rules 5 and 7);
racial and religious discriminations are outlawed, but if
they occur the fact of their existence is to be denied (rule
9)." The rules to which the above passage refers are rules
of the particular group Weyrauch studied, not necessarily
rules of all small groups. Nonetheless, in his group's
unspoken rules that both espouse equality and deny the
existence of discrimination, we see an example of the
silence surrounding the systems of privilege that permeate
our culture and the small groups within it. This silence
about privilege ensures its perpetuation. Antidis-
crimination law encourages this silence by not noticing
the operation of privilege. Law faculties have further
incentive to deny that discrimination has occurred to
avoid liability in an employment discrimination suit.
To enter academia and advance in it, one must know
the "rules of the game." It has been observed that "All
institutions operate through a set of formal and informal
rules.... [T]he rules for entry into the profession are fairly
straightforward... .The rules for employment and
professional advancement, however, are harder to define,
varying with the kind of institution, the region, and the
times." 7 The same can be said about law, since to become
a lawyer and to enter the profession, one must pass a bar
exam; but to become a law professor, the institution,
region, and times affect the "qualifications."
The study of small group dynamics has important
ramifications for hiring decisions generally and for law
school hiring in particular. The dynamics of sex, race, and
heterosexual privilege, which are social realities in
contemporary America, interface with the rules of each
faculty group as the hiring decision is made, but at a level
so far beneath the surface that the decisions are insulated
from review. The absence of procedural or constitutional
protection for the hiring process, as well as the absence of
hard and last rules, make it particularly difficult to change
the group dynamics or prove discrimination. The
privileging of whiteness, maleness, and helerosexualilv is
the "rule" that exists outside the group and becomes
incorporated into the group dynamic. Thus the legal
doctrine is unable to adequately address the reality of the
situation-thc subtlety of discrimination and the deeply
hidden levels on which it occurs.
The group dynamic of sclf-pcrpcluation predominates
over any sense of urgency about the need for integration
or diversification. The need to act affirmatively to change
the status quo is not a fell need in the context of the
group. For those in no rush, the legal doctrine's inability
to reach the deep layers of group interaction is an
advantage. Yet the metaphor of an ambulance, which
breaks the law by traveling through traffic signals to
render emergency aid, more aptly suggests the kind of
response the legal system should take to privilege and
discrimination in American society.
When law faculty talk about hiring, certain criteria and
phrases are an acceptable part of the discourse, which
ostensibly is about the qualifications of the applicant. No
one wants to hire an applicant who is not qualified. And
so participants in the discourse tacitly agree that the
conversation is about evaluating qualifications and
eliminating the unqualified.
But the conversation that is really going on is not at all
about qualifications. The discussants arc asking. "Will this
person fit into our group, fit into our institution? Will this
person change it in any way that will make me not fit, or
hurt my place in the institution in any way? If someone
comes who is not like me, will I still be valued at this
place, at other places, or have other opportunities?"
"Mirror, mirror, on the wall, who's the fairest of them
all?" We are all familiar with the fairly talc chant (can
beauty be dark in this talc?). The queen is pleased as long
as the mirror answers her question, "You, your majesty."
but she flies into a jealous rage, when the mirror says,
"Snow White." 8 When the "other" is named the most
valuable, the dominant power self-destructs. At some
subliminal level, do the culturally dominant fear that the
introduction of difference represents their destruction,
from either themselves or the outside?
Professor Derrick Bell has recognized this problem in his
discussion of the tipping point issue; for the dominant group
the presence of a few minorities is acceptable, but too many
will tip the balance at which the dominant group feels
comfortable. The hiring discourse tries to place someone on
the scale to measure where that person will weigh in relation
to the tipping point. Will the candidate really be one of the
good old (implicitly white, male, straight) boys?
The faculty debate uses words in the discourse that
involve qualifications; and one must answer in the words
they have established for that discourse, rather than say,
"She's okay; she won't hurl you." And so rather than
speak the words that the group is truly worried about, we
argue about whether she is really qualified.
Group dynamics intersect with systems of privilege to
tacitly reinforce the presence and power of those systems.
Since we have no permission in the group dynamic to
discuss even the existence of these systems, they inevitably
remain. The dominant group retains its sense of entitlement
to group leadership and its deeply held belief that the
leader's vision of the world is the only correct one. The
inclusion and recognition of multiple perspectives would
provide some antidote to the dominance of systems of
privilege within the group dynamic.
A Story about Tradition
We can examine these dynamics at work in the
following scenario.
"Harold, what will it take to get your vote? I know you're
a horse trader from way back." Jessica knew that her
colleague appreciated a direct "cards on the table" approach
to faculty politics. But what might he ask as a quid pro quo?
"There's nothing to horse trade," Harold replied. "You
have no idea how upset I am at the prospect of losing Jared
Daniels as a candidate for this teaching position. You know
what I most care about is hiring the best possible candidate
for this job." Jessica only half listened as Harold extolled the
virtues of his candidate, who was, like Harold, a capable
white man with a good academic record from a local law
school and who had prior teaching experience. Jessica
would have been happy to have him as a colleague; in fact,
she would have preferred him to several of the men now on
her faculty. However, there was only one job right now.
"At least," thought Jessica, "he's conceding there is a
position." She reflected that many of her colleagues often
emphasized how the law school must hire good people
whenever a qualified white male candidate appeared on
the horizon, but when the candidate was a person of color
or a white woman, they questioned whether the school
could really afford to hire anyone.
Jessica, a white woman, had been on the faculty
appointments committee for fifteen years. She had been
hired by Holmes College of Law, a well-known regional
law school, in the early 1970s, along with an African-
American man and a Latino man. The three of them had
been the affirmative action hires. The trio all had
outstanding credentials, in some cases better than those of
the colleagues they were joining. That faculty had been
composed only of white men. One woman of color, who
had been hired some years earlier, had left. Faced with the
prospect of being an all-white, male faculty, the school
had realized that it should act affirmatively and had
sought female and minority colleagues.
Since joining the hiring committee, Jessica had tried to
be sure that the thirty-member faculty looked at other
qualified people of color and white female applicants for
available teaching positions. Now, fifteen years later, there
were two white women on the faculty, besides Jessica, and
one African-American man. The colleagues who had been
hired with her had left for other institutions; one who had
remained in teaching was at a Midwestern law school and
one had become an appellate court judge. In that same
period, five white men had been hired, in addition to the
two white women and one minority man.
When Harold finished praising his candidate, Jessica
said, "What about our need for affirmative action?"
"Sure," replied Harold, "I can see we need more
conservative Republicans on this faculty; that view is
under-represented here."
Jessica wasn't sure what to do. She could see this would
be a losing battle. Should she try to explain to Harold that
under-representation of women and minorities on law
faculties was not the same thing as not having a Republican
majority on the faculty? Would Harold be able to see that
the Republican viewpoint was easily accessible to students
everywhere in the American culture—in the news, on the
radio? The mainstream culture was in no danger of being
under-represented. It was the viewpoint of those outside
that culture that was in danger of being unheard.
As she left his office, Jessica promised Harold to leave
him a book review by Ursula K. LeGuin and said they
would talk later.
The Majoritarian Culture
Ursula K. LeGuin has written,
We human beings long to get the world under
our control and to make other people act just
like us. In the last few centuries, some of us
—
variously described as the White Man, the
West, the Colonial Powers, Industrial
Civilization, the March of Progress—found out
how to do it. The result is that now many of us
all over the world are eating hamburgers at
McDonald's. Since other results include forests
destroyed for pasture for the cattle to make the
hamburgers, and oceans suffocated by waste
products of making plastic boxes for
hamburgers, the success of the White Man's
control of the world is debatable, but his
success in making other people act just like
him is not. NO culture that has come in contact
with Western industrial culture has been
unchanged by it, and most have been
assimilated or annihilated, surviving only as
vestigial variations in dress, cooking, or ethics. 9
This "tremendous process of acculturation" has affected
law school culture and legal education as well. Although it
is only a microcosm of the greater social issues LeGuin
describes, legal education has reflected the same instinct to
make other people act just like us, the "us" that makes up
the majoritarian dominant culture. And we who are not
part of that majority culture are affected by the time we
spend in the institution and find ourselves playing roles
that move us toward that mainstream.
The use of the term "diversity" is an acknowledgment
that there might be some real value in not simply
perpetuating the sameness of the forceful majoritarian
culture. Yet the powerful human instinct that LeGuin
describes, the need to control others and make them act
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"just like us," creates a felt tension within some minds
between the goal of diversity and the desirability of that
goal. The majoritarian pull to make others act like us is
powerful, conflicting with the goal of diversity.
Law itself mirrors the conflict between the need for
uniform treatment of like situations and the need to do
justice when like situations may not be exactly alike. In
the arena of sex discrimination jurisprudence, argument
about whether men and women should be treated alike,
minimizing the significance of reproductive differences
between men and women, has stirred debate. Broad legal
acceptance of the view that equality means minimizing
differences, termed Lhe assimilationist view; demonstrates
that even in legal arguments the urge toward uniformity is
powerfully felt.
In our culture, the image of the melting pot is forceful;
it speaks to the powerful positive image that assimilation
carries. The message to those outside the mainstream
dominant culture is "Melt in with us, be like us, or fail to
do so at your peril." Diversity is the antidote to
assimilation because it includes a celebration of
differences and recognizes the contribution of all. People
need to act affirmatively to tell a different story, one that
celebrates diversity and underlines that we have not all
melted together, nor do we need to.
Opening the Door
Affirmative action in the U.S. Supreme Court has had
an uneven history. But the Court dynamics in the first fully
considered affirmative action case, in which Allan Bakke
filed a lawsuit to gain admission to the Medical School at
the University of California at Davis, revealed the kind of
majoritarian elite decision making that has doomed the
affirmative action debate. Bakke, a white man, had applied
for admission and had been denied twice; he believed the
reason was that Davis Medical School set aside sixteen out
of one hundred admission slots for minority candidates.
The parties to the case were limited to the white plaintiff
and the challenged institution. The voices of people of
color, who might have wanted to support the program, were
excluded and silenced, and Bakke won at the California
Supreme court. The lone dissenter, Justice Matthew O.
Tobriner, wrote, "There is, indeed, a very sad irony to the
fact that the first admission program aimed at promoting
diversity to be struck down under the Fourteenth
Amendment is the program most consonant with the
underlying purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment." 10 The
purposes to which Tobriner referred were the eradication
and remedying of past discrimination. Interestingly, the
phrase "reverse discrimination," which was much used in
the popular press to describe suits brought by white
plaintiffs who felt harmed by affirmative action efforts,
implicitly recognizes this first discrimination (i.e., against
racial minorities) that the Supreme Court has declined to
acknowledge by its ultimate refusal to accept the reality of
societal discrimination as a reason for affirmative action.
Charles Lawrence has described the arguments before the
U.S. Supreme Court as a "discussion among gentlemen."
Archibald Cox, a white Harvard professor who represented
the Universit) of California, had been chosen over several
Black attorneys whom minority groups had urged as the
logical choice. Lawrence explains. "The regents wanted to
make it clear that their lawyer represented the university and
higher education and not the interests of minority groups."
Cox used his role as part of the educational elite to create a
kinship with the justices and lo argue that the Court should
trust universities to make appropriate admissions decisions
without Court intervention. Thus even the oral argument
implicitly recognized the existence of small group
dynamics: Cox appealed lo the justices' sense that he was
one of them and that ultimately he was not working at
cross-—purposes to their best interest.
The opinion of the Court was divided, and Justice
Lewis Powell played a pivotal role. Four Justices, Burger,
Rchnquist, Stevens, and Stewart, interpreting the
controversy narrowly, believed that Title VI" had been
violated by the University's admission policy and that
Allan Bakke should be admitted to the medical school. 13
Justice Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and White
believed that no equal protection or Title VI violation had
occurred and that a race-based classification would not
always be per sc invalid." These justices would prohibit a
race-based classification that was irrelevant or stigmatizing,
but they did not view remedying past discrimination as an
irrelevant or pernicious use of race. This opinion pointed out
that a race-based classification that disadvantaged whites as
a group lacked the indicia of suspectness associated with a
classification that disadvantaged Blacks. Classifications that
disadvantaged whites did not exist in the context of a history
of prior discrimination against whites; whites were not a
discrete and insular minority; race-based classifications
where relevant to remedy past discrimination; and the
remedy, here the Davis plan, was crafted to avoid stigma
against whites, the group Bakke alleged was hurl.
The Brennan group, rejecting minimum scrutiny equal
protection review, articulated a test to review race-based
classifications that was based on the "middle-level
scrutiny" equal protection review that had been previously
articulated in sex-based discrimination cases. First, the
articulated purpose of an allegedly remedial racial
classification should be reviewed; here the concurring
justices said that remedying the effects of past societal
discrimination was an acceptable purpose. Second, the
Court should review whether the means chosen bore a
substantial relation to that articulated purpose. Thus the
Brennan group would ask whether the Davis Medical
School special admissions program, which set aside sixteen
out of one hundred spots for disadvantaged minorities,
served an important governmental objective and was
substantially related to achievement of that objective.
Powell, writing for the majority, was joined in part of his
opinion by both groups of justices. He was the only justice
to subscribe to the entire opinion, and his role, weaving a
path between the disagreeing camps, enhanced his image as
a mediator and facilitator on the Court. In his opinion,
Powell rejected the notion of benign discrimination and lhe
notion that there are majorities and minorities. He said that
strict scrutiny should apply to all racial classifications and
11
that racial classifications could not be used as a remedy in
the absence of a finding of constitutional or statutory
discrimination by the appropriate legislative, judicial, or
administrative body. This meant that the university could
not decide for itself that it needed to remedy societal
discrimination in its admissions policy. Powell rejected
several of the university's arguments as to why, under strict
scrutiny of the race classification, an important government
purpose was being served that warranted upholding the
classification. He did not find that the need to remedy the
deficit of minority doctors, to remedy societal
discrimination, or to provide doctors for underserved
communities justified sustaining a racial classification.
But Powell did find that the final argument made by the
University to support its special admissions program, the
need for a diverse student body, was protected by academic
freedom under the First Amendment. He concluded that
"[t]he freedom of a university to make its own judgements
as to education included the selection of its student body."
Essentially Powell was telling universities across the nation
to be more like Harvard and use race, if at all, as just one
factor in admissions. But the significance of the message,
delivered in this guise, is that acting affirmatively is
permissible only if one does not do it too openly. Such a
message legitimates the notion that it is not quite acceptable
to engage in affirmative action, adding to the uneasiness that
surrounds the ideal of diversity. And it further suggests that
there is a limit to how much affirmative action is allowable.
Finally, by grounding this apologetic endorsement of
affirmative action in the First Amendment principle of free
speech and academic freedom, rather than in the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws, the
Supreme Court obscured the essence of equality at stake in
the decision. Diversity, which is essential for equality, is a
continuing component of democracy.
The Segregated Reality
Richard Chused reports that "[r]acial tokenism is alive
and well at American law schools. About one third of all
schools...have no Black faculty members. Another third
have just one." 14 Chused also documents the "failure of a
sizeable segment of law schools, including many of the
highest stature, to hire substantial numbers of women."
Chused's survey of the 1986-87 academic year showed that
women composed 1 1 percent of tenured classroom faculty.
Chused identifies two excuses offered by racially
segregated all-male faculties to justify the lack of racial
and gender diversity at their institutions: 1) qualified
applicants are unavailable, and 2) a slot or position is not
available. Chused's study asserts that both of these
excuses are "hollow," because enough faculties have
achieved diversity to show that there are qualified
candidates for faculty positions, and because turnover is
high enough that positions will become available. He
advocates that "commitment, devotion of time,
willingness to confess error, conscious devotion to finding
and using new methods for recruiting faculty, placement
of existing women and minority faculty on hiring and
tenure committees [, and] the use of substantial numbers of
open faculty slots as targets for the fulfillment of openly
stated hiring goals" be substituted for these excuses as a
means of achieving faculty diversity.
Acting Affirmatively
Without affirmative action, we cannot ensure that our
institutions reflect the ideals of equality, fairness, and equal
opportunity that arc part of our culture. Law professors arc
not unique in this society in holding divergent views about
affirmative action. Law schools, as institutions composed
of the individuals within them, are also not unique in
society as places where the dominant cultural majority
remains in control. Law schools, like other societal
institutions, are composed of well-intentioned individuals,
who, for the most part, genuinely want to be free of
discriminatory attitudes. But as Charles Lawrence has
pointed out in the area of unconscious racism—and his
thesis holds for unconscious sexism or heterosexism as
well—many acts done with the best intentions are still
racist, sexist, or heterosexist not because we are bad people,
but because we are products of the society in which wc
live. Thus, the cycle of exclusion is unwittingly continued.
Four objections are usually raised about affirmative
action: 1) it violated the democratic ideal that mandates
disregard of color, sex, or sexual orientation, 2) it
undermines merit-based selection, 3) it is unfair to those
who have not discriminated, and 4) it stigmatizes those it
purports to assist. Each argument fails as a reason not to
act affirmatively.
Opponents of affirmative action often argue that attention
to the race or sex of an applicant reduces an individual to a
single attribute, sink color, or sex, and that this process is the
antithesis of equal opportunity. This argument is often
voiced as, "I don't care if she's blue or green and from
Mars, as long as she's competent." The point being made is
that race or sex is irrelevant or should be.
One could imagine a society in which race and sex are
irrelevant. In such a society we might or might not
remember the race or sex of those we meet. But, as
Richard Wassetrom has pointed out, that imagined culture
is not this culture. 15 To say that today's world functions
that way is to deny reality.
The race-and-sex-are-irrelevant argument is attractive
because its proponents advance it as if it were not an
ideal, but reality. We are asked to believe that the
discrimination-free society is here and that to pay
attention to race or sex would be to turn back the clock to
the days before racism and sexism were eliminated. A
moment's reflection makes it clear that we do not live in
such a world. The argument is based on an attractive but
false premise, that the nondiscriminatory future is now
and that except for the occasional aberrant bigot or sexist,
we live in a race- and sex-neutral society.
The second argument made against affirmative action
is related to the myth of meritocracy and the fear that
affirmative action will result in a lowering of so-called
standards. According to this argument, finding qualified
women or minorities is difficult or impossible, and
standards must be maintained. To the extent that
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affirmative action retains the meaning of giving special
treatment on account of race or sex, opposition to
affirmative action is powerfully ingrained in the
mainstream of our culture. None of us want that special
treatment; we want to be judged on our so-called merit.
Consider this riddle:
A father and his son were driving to a ball
game when their car stalled on the railroad
tracks. In the distance a train whistle blew a
warning. Frantically, the father died to start the
engine, but in his panic, he couldn't turn the
key, and the car was hit by the oncoming train.
An ambulance sped to the scene and picked
them up. On the way to the hospital, the father
died. The son was still alive, but his condition
was very serious, and he needed immediate
surgery. The moment they arrived at the
hospital, he was wheeled into an emergency
operating room, and the surgeon came in
expecting a routine case. However, on seeing
the boy, the surgeon blanched and muttered, "I
can't operate on this boy—he's my son." 16
How could this be? The answer is that the surgeon is
the boy's mother. Although this is an obvious answer once
the listener thinks about it, the point is that most people
do not think about it or else they solve the riddle only
after careful thinking. Most people's instantaneous
reaction is to picture the surgeon as male. 17
This riddle reveals societal default assumptions about
merit—automatic, unconscious assumptions that channel
our thoughts. Members of this culture have trouble seeing
white women and minority group members as surgeons,
lawyers, senior vice presidents, and law professors: the
images society unconsciously associated with these words
are male and white. The knowledge that white women and
people of color can be surgeons does not help listeners
solve the riddle, because the mind makes the culturally
accustomed leaps without going through a rational thought
process. 18 Present definitions of merit are context-based
and shaped by default assumptions.
As to the unfairness affirmative action perpetuates
toward those who did not discriminate, consider that we as
a society pay for much that we did not personally do.
Congress assisted Chrysler, even though all citizens did
not mismanage the company. The societal good of
inclusion of all its members is most pressing and warrants
societal prioritization.
As for stigma, the stigma of being a woman or man-of-
color law professor comes from society's default
assumptions—a woman in front of the room does not look
like Professor Kingsfield in The Paper Chase—and not
from the existence of affirmative action. Affirmative
action should be viewed in a positive light.
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